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 Abstract— Management of security policies has become 
increasingly difficult given the number of domains to manage, 
taken into consideration their extent and their complexity. 
Security experts has to deal with a variety of frameworks and 
specification languages used in different domains that may 
belong to any Cloud Computing or Distributed Systems. This 
wealth of frameworks and languages make the management 
task and the interpretation of the security policies so difficult. 
Each approach provides its own conflict management method 
or tool, the security expert will be forced to manage all these 
tools, which makes the field maintenance and time consuming 
expensive. In order to hide this complexity and to facilitate 
some security expert’s tasks and automate the others, we 
propose a security policies aligning based on ontologies 
process; this process enables to detect and resolve security 
policies conflicts and to support security experts in managing 
tasks. 
Keywords—Security-based policy; security management; 
ontology alignment; ontology enrichment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The security management in Cloud Computing (CC), 
Grid Computing (GC) or Distributed Systems (DS) requires 
the use of a dynamic environment-based policy to overcome 
a set of problems like the number of domains to manage and 
the permanent modifications that could occur inside 
managed environments themselves. However, the main aims 
for the management-based policy are to optimize, minimize 
the human interventions and automate some management 
tasks during security lifecycle. 
Several frameworks of security-based policy and models 
have been proposed in the literature. The present paper will 
focus on the languages associated to KAOS [10], REI [11] 
and Ponder [5]. 
The main issue to manage many heterogeneous security 
domains is to assure interoperability between the enforced 
Security Policies (SP), and also detect and resolve conflicts.  
Conflicts can be categorized in two forms, vertical and 
horizontal conflicts. The vertical ones occur when the SP are 
expressed in a common language while sharing 
heterogeneous knowledge on shared resources, this type of 
conflict is typically semantic. The horizontal conflicts occur 
when security policies are expressed with different 
languages; this type of conflict is due to different syntax for 
used languages. However, to detect and resolve horizontal 
conflicts, a third-party canonical language can be used to 
uniformize and hide syntactic and lexical heterogeneity; as a 
result, we find the vertical form. 
Ontologies are the most used approach to represent 
semantic knowledge, and thereby provide robust 
mechanisms to resolve semantic conflict. In this sense, we 
use the ontologies as a pivot between languages towards to 
facilitate interpretation and understanding for the security 
experts. 
Our goal is to provide a helpful method and tool to hide 
the complexity to deal with multiple specification languages 
that security expert can find to manage several security 
domains like those present in DS, GC or CC. So, we define 
an ontology used as a common knowledge, called in the 
literature support or background ontology [3]. This ontology 
is a semantic consensus on the concepts of different security 
policy specification languages. It is used in a distributed 
environment to supply security domains with a mutual 
agreement on the SP which implies a secured semantic 
interoperability. This paper presents an aligning-based 
ontologies process that supports security experts to manage 
SP , assures the SP conformity and consistency, detects and 
resolves conflicts that may be occur when adding, changing 
or merging SP. 
This work will be presented as follows. The second 
section presents some related researches. The third section 
explains briefly the management-based policy principle. The 
fourth section will display the most used security-based 
policy frameworks such as KAOS, REI and PONDER. The 
fifth section presents our SP alignment process approach by 
using examples for illustration and a prototype is given in 
the sixth section. Finally, the conclusion will be featured in 
the last section. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, we briefly present some of the research 
literature related to some security-based policy frameworks. 
On one hand, there are some works in detecting conflicts 
of security policy related to syntax conflicts. Ponder and 
XACML [27] are typically non-semantic policy framework. 
On the other hand, there are some representative research 
works on semantic conflict detection. KAOS and REI are 
approaches that enriched with semantics using RDF [28] 
and OWL [25] as standards for policy specification. KAOS 
adopt policy priority for the conflict resolution of semantic 
policy [29]. REI combined the method of meta-policy and 
priority for conflict detection and resolution of semantic 
policy [18]. A comparative analysis between semantic and 
non-semantic language is made by Nejdl et al. [30] to show 
the advantages of semantic policy approach. 
Since each semantic approach provides a conflict 
management method, the security expert will be forced to 
manage all these tools. Some works was interested to 
detecting conflict between SP related to a specified 
framework [18][23]. Our goal is to interface with different 
frameworks in order to centralize the conflicts management 
and offer the possibility to compare SP from different 
frameworks in order to detect and resolve conflicts. This 
work cover the first step that present an ontology-based 
method in order to remove all semantic SP ambiguity, assist 
security experts to resolve semantic conflicts and enable an 
automatic resolution for semantic conflicts by adopting a 
conflict resolution based on rules strategy i.e., by combining 
a resolution rules set for each conflict type. 
III. MANAGEMENT-BASED POLICY PRINCIPLE 
The objective of the management-based policy is the 
optimization as well as possible of security experts efforts. 
Thus, it first consists in determining the strategies and the 
tactics reflecting the security expert’s objective and also 
representing them in policies form. Then, these policies 
must be presented as a set of rules to be understood by the 
management entities and stored in a Policy Repository (PR). 
The distribution and the application of these policies require 
to communicate these rules to the PDP (Policy Decision 
Point) and the PEPs (Policy Enforcement Point) managed 
by this latter. The high-level policy defined by security 
expert, cannot be directly understood by equipments or 
applications. It is therefore necessary to translate it into the 
configuration rules. At each stage, several policies may 
conflict. There is no simple recipe for solving all conflicts 
encountered. Ultimately, the security expert must perform 
this task. 
The term subject refers to users, principals, or automated 
manager components, which have management 
responsibility (i.e., have the authority to initiate a 
management decision). The term target refers to objects on 
which the action can be performed. The relations between 
subject and target [12] are well defined by management 
policies and depend also on the nature of these latter. Thus, 
obligation policies define what a Subject must perform or 
not on the level of a Target, whereas authorization policies 
specify the access rights that could have a Subject on the 
level of a Target. 
The policies rules database is replaced by both a domain 
service and a policy service. In our approach, the policies 
specification will be based on the ontologies, to ensure a 
horizontal and vertical semantics between SP specification 
languages. 
In the next section, we present the security policies 
semantic specification languages chosen through literature. 
IV. POLICY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES AND 
FRAMEWORKS 
SP can be specified in several ways and different 
approaches have been proposed in various application fields 
[16]. However, there are some general requirements that any 
policy representation must satisfy independently of its 
application scope: 
 A great expressiveness that can meets the managed 
system security requirements 
 A simple and effective vocabulary to facilitate to the 
security experts policy development tasks with 
various expertise degrees. 
 An execution space that provide a political 
specifications mapping in different platforms. 
 Scalability to ensure appropriate performance, enable 
the defined policies analysis and achieve an 
appropriate balance between the expression 
objectives, its calculating docility and ease of use. 
This section does not provide security policies 
specification overview, but to describe the semantic aspects 
of some approaches that have been specifically designed and 
tested for the distributed systems management. We first 
present some semantic security approaches KAOS, REI and 
Ponder. 
A. KAOS (Knowledge-able Agent-oriented System) 
KAOS is a framework that provides the policy services 
allowing the specification, management, conflicts 
resolution, and execution of policies within fields. Policies 
are represented in DAML + OIL [2] as ontology. Policy 
ontologies KAOS distinguish between authorizations (i.e., 
constraints that permit or prohibit certain actions) and 
obligations (i.e., constraints that require an action to perform 
or to waive such requirement). 
KAOS detects potential conflicts between the policies at 
the specification moment, every time a user tries to add a 
new policy to the directory service [15]. The engine 
identifies conflicts between policies using the subsumption 
mechanisms between classes and tries to resolve these 
conflicts through political order based on their priority and, 
if necessary, create new harmonized policies [17][18]. 
B. REI 
REI is a framework that includes specifying policies 
support, analysis and reasoning in computer applications 
[11][12]. 
His language policy based on ontological logic allows 
users to express and represent the rights concepts, 
prohibitions, obligations and exemptions. These concepts 
correspond, respectively, to the positive and negative 
authorization conditions, and to positive and negative 
obligations in Ponder and KAOS. 
REI is based on an application-independent ontology to 
represent the rights concepts, prohibitions, requirements, 
exemptions and the politics rules. This allows different 
components from the same domain to understand and 
interpret REI policies in the right way. REI’s policy 
specification can be in forms of Prolog predicates or RDF-S 
[31] statements. REI extends OWL with the expression of 
relations like role-value maps, which makes the language 
itself more expressive than original OWL. 
 
C. Ponder 
Ponder is a declarative object-oriented language that 
supports several types of distributed systems management 
policies specification. It’s providing technical structuring 
policies to meet the policy administration complexity in 
large company information systems [5][8][9]. The basic 
types of political rights in Ponder are obligations and 
permissions. 
Ponder has a conflict detection tool to detect overlaps 
and conflicts between policies. Similar to KAOS and REI, 
the tool can detect inconsistencies in the policy specification 
that may arise between policies with opposite signs 
modalities which refer to the same subjects, targets or 
actions (e.g., conflict between permissions [4]). 
Following is an SP comparative table for semantic 
specification languages based on several criteria. 
TABLE I.  SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES COMPARISON OF SEMANTIC SECURITY 
POLICY  
 KAOS REI Ponder Our 
approa
ch 
ontology-based yes yes no yes 
policy-type Access 
control 
based 
Access 
control 
based 
Access 
control 
based 
Access 
control 
based 
and 
manage
ment 
Policy 
representation 
Owl Rei (Prolog 
like 
syntax+ 
RDF-S 
Ponder 
language 
specification 
OWL 
Open security 
interoperability 
support 
Applying 
mediatin
g and 
proxy 
agents on 
to 
specific 
domains 
Applicable 
in specific 
domains 
Applicable 
in specific 
domains 
Applica
ble in 
specific 
domains 
Interoperability 
representation 
Explicit  Explicit Explicit Explicit 
Reasoning 
support 
Java 
theorem 
Prolog 
engine 
Event 
calculus 
representatio
n 
Java 
theorem 
Security 
ontology 
enrichment 
no no no yes 
 
Our goal is to ensure unified presentation of different 
semantics languages and other SP specifications through a 
specification languages transformation set to a single 
ontological representation. This transformation can resolve 
vertical level conflicts by hiding the heterogeneous 
knowledge semantic heterogeneity and horizontal level 
conflicts by hiding the languages heterogeneity. Since each 
approach KAOS, REI, or Ponder provides a conflict 
management method, the security expert will be forced to 
manage all these tools from different approaches. In order to 
hide this complexity, we also manage the horizontal level 
conflicts between different languages to facilitate some 
security expert tasks and automate the others. In the present 
work we focus on the semantic conflicts resolution tasks 
between SP. We will present in this work an ontology-
based method in order to remove all semantic SP  
ambiguity, assist security experts to resolve semantic 
conflicts and enable an automatic resolution for semantic 
conflicts by adopting a conflict resolution based on rules 
strategy: by combining a resolution rules set for each 
conflict type. 
D. Types of conflicts 
To harmonize the SP, we must lift any type of conflict 
that we enumerate into three categories: syntactic, structural 
and semantic conflicts. The first conflict type concerns 
identity or abbreviation conflicts introduced during SP 
designing or primitives like operations and attributes. The 
second one involves structural conflicts between classes. 
Here we distinguish between those related to association 
type between two elements and those related to the 
hierarchy relative to an abstraction level. The third conflict 
type concerns the conflicts that involve semantic elements 
like naming conflicts, measurement and confusion. These 
conflict types can occur in two forms vertical and horizontal 
form. 
 Vertical conflicts occur when we have SP expressed 
in a common language while sharing heterogeneous 
knowledge on shared resources, this type of conflict is 
typically semantic.  
 Horizontal conflicts, they occur when security 
policies are expressed with different languages, this 
syntactic type of conflict is due to different syntax 
languages. 
V. SEMANTIC ALIGNMENT PROCESS OF SECURITY 
POLICIES 
In our study, we could see that the ontology languages 
facilitate understanding between interoperate entities. 
However, interoperability access controls cannot be 
implemented without the semantic compatibility 
establishment between the SP agents participating in the 
exchange. One of the problems is heterogeneity between 
different organizations entities, this heterogeneity makes the 
semantic compatibility establishing so difficult. The 
scientific community became interested in ontological 
models for the access control purposes. The most significant 
models in our view are KAOS [10] and REI [13][20].  
In this section, we present our SP alignment process that 
can possibly be described with semantic specification 
languages like KAOS, REI or others. 
A. Security policy semantic alignment process 
The semantic alignment process allows detecting and 
resolving naming semantic conflicts type between candidate 
SP for cooperation in distributed systems, and it enable to 
enhance the security ontology used as support ontology 
during the alignment process. 
 
 
The alignment process inputs are: 
 A SP set, denoted SP1, SP2 ... SPn, selected by the 
security expert for their alignment. 
 A security ontology chosen by the security expert 
according to SP type used in the distributed system. 
It will serve as support ontology during the 
alignment process. 
The alignment process provides as outputs: 
 A new enriched security ontology by new semantic 
relations added due to two treatments that we apply 
in the process: ontologies alignment and 
enrichment, which can be used to update the initial 
security ontology and serve as new support ontology 
in future integration iterations thereby increasing the 
process efficiency. 
 Correspondence ontology, security experts can use 
this ontology to detect and resolve semantic 
conflicts in a semi-automatic process. 
The semantic alignment process is highlighted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Matching security policy process. 
Our proposal is based on several research projects 
results, especially those concerning the SP transformation 
described in the SP specification languages in ontologies 
description languages [7], and those related to the ontologies 
security alignment and enhancement [3][7][19][20]. The 
security policy transformation into ontologies relies on the 
work cited above to transform SP to Security Ontology 
Policies (SOP). 
The integration process involves two steps: 
1. The candidate security policies for alignment-based 
ontology 
The candidates SP for alignment are conceptual safety 
rules set representations. They are described in a given 
modelling language (formal, semi-formal or natural). 
Several studies have focused on the conceptual models 
transformation [7][21][22][24]. We rely on this work for the 
SP transformation into ontologies. 
2. Aligning obtained ontologies based on security 
ontology 
The ontologies alignment consists on establishing 
correspondences between two ontologies, with a priori on 
the same knowledge domain. It helps to find semantic 
relations between concepts defined in ontologies to align. 
In order to achieve semantic SP alignment, we rely on an 
ontology aligning method [1] based on support ontology, 
also called in the literature “background ontology” [3].  
This step takes as input:  
 Ontologies obtained in the previous step. 
 The security ontology. 
Results: 
 An ontology alignment results of all available 
ontologies as input. 
 The ontology of security enhanced by new 
relationships. 
Support Ontology is in our case, the SP ontology used 
by the distributed system.  
B. Security ontology enrichment 
The enrichment allows identifying new elements: 
concepts, terms and relations, then place them in an existing 
ontology. Enrichment and manual ontology construction 
prove to be tedious and expensive tasks [3]. Several studies 
have proposed automated methods or semi-automated 
enrichment and ontologies construction. Most of these 
methods rely on external sources from which new semantic 
knowledge are identified, evaluated and placed in the 
ontology to enrich it. 
The method for measuring semantic similarity [1] uses 
security ontology enrichment process, when it has no 
semantic relation between concepts to align. To implement 
this process and demonstrate its feasibility, we chose, and 
that as an example, two rules among the various rules on 
semantic relationships: 
 R1: Two concepts are similar if their neighbours are 
similar equivalents. According to [24], two concepts 
are similar if their sub-concepts "son" are similar. 
This was confirmed in [6]. 
 R2: Two concepts are similar if their sub-concepts 
"son" are similar. 
Rule R2 focuses on the composite concepts. The 
composite concepts represent concepts Father and sub-
components concepts linked by a semantic relationship like 
“part-of”, are the concepts son. 
Let C1 and C2 two concepts to align belonging to SOPi; 
we distinguish three cases: 
Case 1: C1 and C2 recognize a semantic relationship 
within SOPi. This relationship is then injected into the 
Security Ontology (SO). 
Case 2: C1 and C2 do not allow SOPi in semantic 
relation while there are two concepts in SOPi, C1’ and C2’ 
and two semantic relations of equivalence, the first between 
C1 and C1’ and the second between C2 and C2’. 
From R1 we can deduce a new semantic relationship 
between C1 and C2 that is injected into the security 
ontology SO. 
Case 3: C1 and C2 are concepts that do not allow 
composite semantic relation in SOPi, while there are 
semantic relations between concepts in their respective son. 
Let {C11, C12 ...C1n} the C1 son concepts set and 
{C21, C22 ... C2n} the C2 son concepts set, as is C1i and 
C2i admit a semantic relationship within SOPi. From R2, we 
can deduce a new semantic relationship between C1 and C2 
that is injected into the security ontology SO. 
C. Semantic and syntactic similarity measuring 
To achieve the ontologies alignment for the various SP, 
we reuse methods for measuring semantic and syntactic 
similarity proposed in [1], which proposes several methods 
for measuring semantic and syntactic similarity. 
Ontologies alignment process product aligned ontology, 
which defines the semantic relationships between several 
sources ontologies concepts. Obviously, we need a model 
that combines semantic relationship to each one or more 
rules, they can be different types: transformation rules, 
merging, mapping, renaming or deleting... 
D. Conflict resolution rules 
To demonstrate how to use correspondence ontology, we 
present resolution rules for naming conflicts derived from 
semantic relation: homonym and synonym existing in 
correspondence ontology result of our process. 
Conflict Resolution Rule 1: if we have a semantic 
relation type synonym in the correspondence ontology 
between concepts of sources ontologies, we offer security 
experts to rename the concepts with same name. 
Conflict Resolution Rule 2: if we have a semantic 
relationship type homonym in the correspondence ontology 
between concepts of sources ontologies, we offer security 
experts to rename the concepts with different names. 
Figure 2 shows a namely conflict resolution assisted by 
security experts based on a set of conflict resolution rules 
stored in a catalogue. 
Based on correspondence ontology and the conflict 
resolution rules, we offer security expert decisions set 
represented by derived operations set. For example, in case 
of type synonym relationship in correspondence ontology 
then find in the catalogue the resolving conflicts (conflict 
resolution rule 1), then propose to security expert an 
operation “rename” one of concepts in conflicts. 
Figure 2. Matching security policy process with actions. 
 
E. Matching security policies in Cloud Computing 
environments 
Cloud computing providers can build large datacenters 
at low cost due to their expertise in organizing and 
provisioning computational resources. The economies of 
scale increase revenue for cloud providers and lower costs 
for cloud users. 
Several entities intend to take part in the benefits of 
Cloud Computing by outsourcing their infrastructure while 
keeping their policy and operational security system. To 
illustrate our process of matching the SP, we present the 
case of several entities wishing to outsource their 
infrastructure to a Cloud Computing and using different 
security policies expressed in different SP specification 
languages. Our approach offers to the Cloud Computing 
security experts a tool to manage these different SP while 
ensuring consistency with the Cloud Computing security 
policy if necessary. For this, we propose to align the 
different SP to provide a unified global vision and thus 
detect potential conflicts between these SP. The security 
expert can rely on an ontology correspondence as a decision 
support to detect synonyms and homonyms concepts; this 
example is highlighted in Figure 3. This process is essential 
toward a centralized management tool in CC environments.  
Figure 3. Matching security policy example 
In the follow section, we show an example to illustrate 
the ontologies alignment process presented by Figure 2, and 
validate the function of this process. For example, as shown 
in Figure 4, we suppose that the collaborative environment 
is composed by two virtual domains. So, the input contains 
two cases which are obtained from domain A and domain B, 
each case describes the positive authorization policy in REI 
Prolog format, which specifies that an entity X (P in case 1 
and Q in case 2) can use the printing service when it is an IT 
department member. The part of the instances describing 
two cases is as follow: 
Case 1 from domain A 
The following is a positive example for authorization 
policy in REI Prolog format [32].  
has(P,permit(usePrintingService,[member(P, 
ITDepartment)]). 
The example above specifies that an entity P can use the 
printing service when it is an IT department member in 
domain A. 
Case 2 from domain B 
We consider the same proposals described in case 1 by 
replacing the entity P by Q and domain A by domain B.  
has(Q, allow(usePrintingService,[member (Q, 
ITDepartment)]).  
 
Figure 4. The two cases represented fragments ontologies 
We apply the matching process of aligning two cases 1 
and 2 from domain A and B, we obtain a correspondence 
ontology that represents the tow concepts in 
conflict(synonym(permit, allow)) and based on 
correspondence ontology to derive the rule of conflict 
resolution to use. In this example it is the conflict resolution 
rule 1 then proposes to security experts an operation 
“rename” one of the component concepts by the same 
concepts. 
The example, shown in Figure 4, allows presenting how 
to solve the naming conflict between the concepts from the 
two cases specified by the security policy: REI. Our 
approach can solve all conflicts types: horizontal and 
vertical knowing that we define the resolution rules for each 
relationship between concepts in the correspondence 
ontology. 
VI. PROTOTYPE 
In order to validate and to evaluate our process of 
semantic matching of security policies, we have developed a 
prototype baptized Semantic Matching of Security Policies 
(SMSP). The prototype SMSP takes first in entry the 
domain security ontology and the security policies to match; 
and transforms them into ontologies described in OWL [26].  
Security expert chooses the appropriate actions to 
perform through a list of rules already established in order 
to resolve the semantic conflicts. Then, SMSP applies 
various treatments associated with each step of our proposed 
method, in particular similarity measurement and security 
ontology enrichment. After those treatments, domain 
security ontology were be enriched with new semantic 
relationships toward to be used in similar situations. 
Figure 5 presents a screen capture of SMSP that shows a 
use case for matching security policies; user can load 
domain ontology and the two security policies to match, and 
perform an action by merging, renaming or deleting 
conflicting concepts. 
Figure 5. A prototype of Semantic Matching of Security Policies 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We were interested in this work to conflict resolution 
semantic naming type when aligning SP in distributed 
multi-systems security policies. Our solution is based on 
ontologies mediation for SP cooperation and understanding. 
We propose a helpful process for security experts, this 
process permit to mask heterogeneity and resolve conflicts 
between SP, using different steps. The first and last steps 
concern the processing of conceptual ontological policies 
representations. The second step, which constitutes the 
fundamental part of this work, is a detecting method for the 
semantic conflicts between SP. We expect to continue this 
work first by a formal validation of the solution, and then 
by looking for opportunities to extend it to solve other types 
of semantic conflicts, including conflicts of measurement 
and confusion. We plan to further our research on the use of 
this approach in CC environments toward a centralised 
management of security policies, we will propose a 
framework that can interface with other security-based 
frameworks to ensure the interoperability and also enrich 
them with semantic relationships. 
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